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Abstract: Greater gender diversity on bank board of directors is associated with higher compensation 
inequality because CEOs at these banks have higher base salary. This effect disappears during the financial 
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CEO compensation and pay inequality at financial firms were highlighted as important policy issues in the 
wake of the financial crisis.  Compensation schemes for bank CEOs could lead banks to take excessive 
risks which ultimately could have real economic impact.  In this paper, we examine the determinants of 
CEO compensation and pay inequality in large US bank holding companies, with a particular focus on the 
role of the gender composition of the board of directors. 
 Our work is related to two different strands of the economics literature.  One strand looks at the 
influence of the board of directors on CEO compensation (Faulkender and Yang, 2010; Ayadi and 
Boujelbene, 2013).   This literature has found a role for the power of the CEO and several characteristics 
of the board.  A second strand of the literature examines the performance effects of gender diversity on 
bank board of directors (Adams and Mehran, 2012; Garcia-Meca et al, 2015).  While this literature has 
found mixed results, recently, Owen and Temesvary (forthcoming) reconcile these results by showing that 
positive performance benefits of gender diversity occur only when 1) there is a threshold number of women 
on the board, and 2) the bank is well managed. 
 Our results complement the findings in both strands of the previous literature, showing that another 
aspect of board characteristics, gender diversity, increases CEO compensation.  Furthermore, we find some 
evidence that this impact is nonlinear, supporting previous results that show that the impact of diversity is 
context dependent (Joshi and Roh, 2009). 
2 Data and Methods 
Our data set contains annual observations of bank and board characteristics from 87 bank holding 
companies (henceforth, banks) in the United States over the time period 1999-2015.  The data is drawn 
from multiple sources:  Boardex, Bankscope, Compustat, and CRSP.  Data availability restricts our sample 
to the larger banks; the banks in our sample hold around 40 percent of all bank holding company assets in 
the United States.   
To measure gender diversity, we use the Blau Index (Blau 1977), defined as follows: 
(1)                                                            𝐵 = [1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑔
2𝐺
𝑔=1 ] × 100 
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where P is the fraction of directors of gender g.  It reaches its maximum when the shares of men and women 
on the board are equal.  Because no bank in our sample has a female share greater than 50 percent, the Blau 
Index is highly correlated with the percent of women on the board.  The average female share in our sample 
is about 10 percent, corresponding to an average Blau Index of about 18.   
To explore the relationship between gender diversity and pay inequality, we estimate the following 
equation: 
(2)                 𝑌𝑡
𝑏 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼5𝑍𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑡−1
𝑏 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑏 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑏 
In Equation 2, 𝑌𝑡
𝑏denotes a ratio of CEO compensation to average staff compensation and 𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏  is the lagged 
value of the Blau Index. In the numerator of 𝑌𝑡
𝑏, we use three different CEO pay metrics: total compensation 
of the CEO, the base salary of the CEO, and bonuses paid to the CEO.  The denominator, average staff 
compensation, is the mean value of total compensation to all workers except the CEO, calculated from 
aggregate values from financial reporting.   In some specifications, we also include the square of the Blau 
Index (𝑋𝑡−1
𝑏 )2  to allow for nonlinear effects of gender diversity. 
Equation 2 also controls for bank and board characteristics.  𝑍𝑡−1
𝑏  is the vector of board 
characteristics which includes: Board Size, Average Age of Board Members, and the natural logarithm of 
Average Director Compensation of Board Members, Average Wealth of Board Members, Average Years 
on Bank Boards, Average Number of Boards Served, and Average Number of Years on Any Board. The 
vector of bank balance sheet characteristics in 𝑆𝑡−1
𝑏  contains the Loan to Deposit Ratio, log of Total Assets, 
Return on Average Equity, and the Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio. Furthermore, 𝐵𝑏 and 𝑇𝑡 represent bank 
and year fixed effects.  We use lagged values of all independent variables to mitigate concerns about reverse 
causality.  Finally, because there are some outliers in the CEO pay ratio, we report results after a 1% and 
99% winsorization from below and above, respectively. 
3 Results 
Table 1 displays results for the estimation of Equation 2.  Column 1 examines total compensation of the 
CEO divided by compensation of the average worker.  In Column 1, the Blau index enters positively, 
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suggesting that greater gender diversity is associated with greater compensation inequality.  Interestingly, 
although many of the bank and year fixed effects (not shown on the table) are statistically significant, none 
of the bank balance sheet traits that vary from year to year are.  A few of the board characteristics are 
significant, with younger boards and boards with directors that have more years of experience on bank 
boards having higher pay inequality.  Finally, we find no evidence of a quid pro quo between directors and 
CEOs:  there is no evidence that directors that are compensated more for their board service reward the 
CEO with higher compensation.   
The result that more gender diversity is related to higher pay inequality is somewhat surprising, 
given the experimental literature that concludes that women have a greater preference for equality (Croson 
and Gneezy, 2009).  To gain better insight into this result, we examine different components of CEO 
compensation, starting first with the base salary (Column 2).  While bonuses for short-term performance 
could be incentives for bank CEOs to take greater short-term risk, the base salary provides less direct 
incentives for such risk-taking.  The results in Column 2 support the conclusion that greater gender diversity 
is associated with greater inequality when that inequality is measured using the ratio of the CEO salary to 
the average worker compensation.   
 To gain further understanding of the higher inequality, we examine the determinants of the log of 
CEO salary at these banks.  The results in Column 3 mirror those in Column 2, suggesting that the higher 
inequality is a result of a higher numerator in our CEO pay ratio: more gender-diverse boards pay bank 
CEOs higher base salaries.   This could be consistent with greater risk aversion if it were a result of base 
salaries being a more important component of overall compensation. However, in results not reported in 
detail here, we do not find any statistically significant effect of gender diversity on the share of 
compensation that is attributable to base salary vs. bonus pay.   
 Higher CEO salary could be an indication that the CEO has more power.  The number of women 
on these boards is small; we do not know how powerful they are in boardroom discussions.  It is possible 
that when there are only a small fraction of women on the board, their voices are weaker which weakens 
the board overall and gives the CEO more power (Usman et al, 2018).  However, as the gender diversity of 
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the board expands, raising the influence of the female board members, the overall strength of the board may 
also increase (Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014; Owen and Temesvary, 2018).  In fact, the negative and 
significant coefficient on the square of the Blau Index in Column 4 shows that there is a nonlinear effect of 
gender diversity on the CEO salary.  As gender diversity increases, its impact on CEO salary diminishes.  
Thus, our findings of a positive relationship between gender diversity and CEO pay may not be indicative 
of the preferences of the individual female board members, but rather the dynamics of having a small 
number of women on the board.   
Unfortunately, our sample is dominated by banks with two or less women on their boards and does 
not contain any banks with board gender equality; we are unable to directly test how CEO compensation 
changes when women are not substantially in the minority.  However, the nonlinear relationship between 
diversity and CEO pay is consistent with the functioning of the board improving when gender representation 
is more equal.  This phenomena has been demonstrated with experimental results, showing that business 
team performance is highest with gender equality (Hoogendorn et al., 2013).  It is also consistent with 
results in the organizational psychology literature that suggest that in male-dominated professions, an initial 
increase in gender diversity has a negative impact (Joshi and Roh, 2009). 
 We seek further insight into the reward for risk-taking by examining how gender diversity of the 
board of directors is related to pay inequality during the financial crisis.  We create an indicator variable 
for the years of the crisis (2008 and 2009) and interact it with all of our independent variables, including 
the Blau Index, to examine if there is a differential effect during this time.  We examine the overall 
compensation ratio (Column 5), and its components: the base salary ratio (Column 6) and the bonus ratio 
(Column 7).  In Column 5, the statistically significant negative coefficient on the Blau Index interacted with 
the crisis dummy is almost equal to the positive coefficient on the Blau Index, indicating that the positive 
effect of gender diversity on pay inequality is erased during the crisis.  The insignificance of the Blau Index 
interacted with the crisis dummy in the base salary ratio estimation (Column 6) suggests that this effect 
occurred through adjustment of bonus compensation.  Results in Column 7 confirm this idea.  The negative 
and significant coefficient on the interaction of the Blau Index and the crisis dummy in the estimation of 
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the CEO bonus ratio suggests that CEO bonuses decreased more during the crisis at banks with more gender 
diversity.  More gender-diverse boards were more willing to punish CEOs during times of extreme poor 
performance.  If gender diversity is linked to CEO power but bank CEOs lost that power during the financial 
crisis, this result is consistent with lower CEO power reducing CEO compensation. 
4 Conclusion 
Our work finds evidence that increased gender diversity of bank boards is associated with higher levels of 
base pay earned by CEOs and more compensation inequality overall.  We achieve these results by 
controlling for bank fixed effects as well as several measures of bank performance, allowing us to rule out 
many explanations that are related to the performance effects of gender diversity or characteristics of banks 
that might have more women on their boards.  A possible interpretation is that our results are indicative of 
complex boardroom dynamics and their influence on CEO power when women are a significant minority 
on the board.   
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Blau 0.760** 0.0688*** 0.00592*** 0.0148*** 0.802* 0.0733*** 0.0257 
 (0.376) (0.0168) (0.00215) (0.00536) (0.410) (0.0175) (0.0660) 
Blau Squared    -0.000213*    
    (0.000111)    
Blau*crisis     -0.816** 0.0214 -0.311*** 
     (0.402) (0.0322) (0.106) 
Board Characteristics        
Board size 1.504 0.0854 0.00306 0.00278 1.804 0.0677 0.416 
 (1.054) (0.0521) (0.00416) (0.00420) (1.101) (0.0543) (0.427) 
ln(Director Compensation) 1.069 0.0736 -0.00668 -0.00657 -0.194 0.0779 1.129* 
 (3.902) (0.178) (0.0268) (0.0264) (3.862) (0.175) (0.607) 
Average Age of Board -145.1* -7.724* -0.323 -0.322 -224.8** -1.470 -23.25 
 (87.41) (4.537) (0.420) (0.423) (90.18) (4.338) (15.26) 
ln(average years on bank 
boards) 67.66** 3.160* 0.149 0.148 58.21* 3.185** 17.38*** 
 (29.03) (1.688) (0.144) (0.145) (31.13) (1.358) (5.537) 
ln(average number of boards) 13.53 -0.371 -0.112 -0.131 9.946 -0.323 2.977 
 (20.67) (1.394) (0.167) (0.166) (22.26) (1.247) (3.471) 
ln(average years on any board) -0.761 2.047** 0.109 0.105 17.63 1.035 -1.942 
 (14.13) (0.858) (0.0783) (0.0783) (17.56) (0.772) (2.270) 
Bank Characteristics        
ln(total assets) 5.248 2.427*** 0.275*** 0.259*** 9.008 2.517*** 2.245 
 (13.22) (0.586) (0.0747) (0.0721) (13.53) (0.571) (1.782) 
Risk-weighted capital ratio -0.794 0.0620 -0.00551 -0.00494 0.440 0.0428 0.402 
 (1.021) (0.0755) (0.0112) (0.0109) (1.122) (0.0744) (0.250) 
Loans to deposits ratio -9.222 -0.0250 0.0173 0.00681 -13.54 0.320 -7.624 
 (26.67) (1.149) (0.0912) (0.0904) (26.49) (1.133) (4.922) 
Return on average equity 0.223 -0.00947 -0.000205 -0.000264 0.294 -0.0287 0.119 
 (0.258) (0.0216) (0.00207) (0.00206) (0.591) (0.0309) (0.0895) 
        
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Bank Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Crisis Interaction with All 
Independent Vars. no no no no yes yes yes 
        
Observations 732 735 688 688 732 735 402 
R-squared 0.666 0.775 0.836 0.837 0.685 0.778 0.937 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,  
*p<0.1      
 
 
